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ABSTRACT: According to conciliatory views about the epistemology of disagreement, 
when epistemic peers have conflicting doxastic attitudes toward a proposition and fully 
disclose to one another the reasons for their attitudes toward that proposition (and 
neither has independent reason to believe the other to be mistaken), each peer should 
always change his attitude toward that proposition to one that is closer to the attitudes of 
those peers with which there is disagreement. According to pure higher-order evidence 
views, higher-order evidence for a proposition always suffices to determine the proper 
rational response to disagreement about that proposition within a group of epistemic 
peers. Using an analogue of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, I shall argue that no 
conciliatory and pure higher-order evidence view about the epistemology of disagreement 
can provide a true and general answer to the question of what disagreeing epistemic peers 
should do after fully disclosing to each other the (first-order) reasons for their conflicting 
doxastic attitudes. 
KEYWORDS: Arrow's theorem, epistemology, higher-order evidence, peer disagreement, 
rationality 
 
1. Views about the Epistemology of Disagreement 
Situations often arise in which we find ourselves disagreeing with our peers. Even 
when we have access to the same evidence and respond to that evidence in equally 
reliable ways, we sometimes form conflicting beliefs. This occurs, for example, 
when jurors reach different judgments about a defendant's guilt; when meteoro-
logists offer competing weather forecasts; when philosophers do metaphysics; when 
scientists offer conflicting accounts of experimental data; when physicians pro-
nounce different causes for the same diseases; when politicians make different 
policy recommendations for addressing social issues; and so on.1  
                                                                 
1 Richard Feldman, "Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement," in Epistemology Futures, ed. 
Stephen Hetherington (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 216-236; Thomas Kelly, "Peer 
Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence," in Disagreement, eds. Richard Feldman and Ted 
Warfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 111-174. 
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There are several competing views about the proper rational response to 
disagreement within a group of epistemic peers. According to conciliatory views, 
when epistemic peers have conflicting doxastic attitudes toward a proposition and 
fully disclose to one another the reasons for their attitudes toward that proposition 
(and neither has independent reason to believe the other to be mistaken), each peer 
should always change his attitude toward that proposition to one that is closer to 
the attitudes of those peers with which there is disagreement.2 Steadfast views, in 
contrast, maintain that when epistemic peers have conflicting doxastic attitudes 
toward a proposition and fully disclose to one another the reasons for their attitudes 
toward that proposition, sometimes some peers may maintain their original attitude 
toward the proposition.3  
There are also competing views about the kind of evidence that determines 
the proper rational response to disagreement within a group of epistemic peers. 
First-order evidence for a proposition is any evidence that bears directly on that 
proposition's truth-value. First-order evidence can include perceptual evidence, 
testimonial evidence, inferential evidence, intuition, and so on. Higher-order 
evidence for a proposition, in contrast, is evidence about first-order evidence for 
that proposition.4 For example, a person's higher-order evidence for the proposition 
that God exists might include the fact that a peer takes the ontological argument to 
be sound, the fact that another peer takes the evidential problem of evil to 
conclusively refute God's existence, the fact that a peer takes reports of personal 
experience to be evidence for God's existence, and so on. Higher-order evidence is 
evidence about what first-order evidence supports.  
There is disagreement about whether higher-order evidence for a proposition 
always suffices to determine the proper rational response to disagreement about 
that proposition within a group of epistemic peers. According to what I shall call 
pure higher-order evidence (HOE) views, it does. For example, according to the 
equal weight view, when two peers adopt conflicting doxastic attitudes toward a 
proposition after full disclosure, the rational response to that disagreement depends 
upon what those attitudes are and nothing more. Mixed evidence views, in contrast, 
maintain that sometimes first-order evidence about a proposition helps to 
                                                                 
2 See David Christensen, "Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News," Philosophical Review 
116 (2007): 187-217; Adam Elga, "Reflection and Disagreement," Noûs 41 (2007): 478-502. 
3 I take this terminology from David Christensen, "Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology 
of Controversy," Philosophy Compass 4/5 (2009): 756. See also Kelly, "Peer Disagreement and 
Higher-Order Evidence" and Thomas Kelly, "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement," in 
Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume I, eds. Tamar Szabò Gendler and John Hawthorne 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 167-196. 
4 See Kelly, "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement," 185-190. 
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determine the proper rational response to disagreement. Examples of what I am 
calling mixed views are Kelly's total evidence view and Lackey's justificationist 
view.5 
I shall argue that no view that is both conciliatory and pure HOE can provide 
a true and general answer to the question of what disagreeing epistemic peers 
should do after fully disclosing to each other the (first-order) reasons for their 
conflicting doxastic attitudes. As a matter of principle, any such view is committed 
to two constraints about the way in which the rational response to disagreement 
among epistemic peers is a function of those peers' higher-order evidence. These 
constraints, and an additional adequacy condition for all views of peer disagreement, 
are formal analogues to the ones that appear in Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.6 
This analogy, together with replies to potential objections, show that conciliatory 
pure HOE views are either false or unacceptably ad hoc. 
I begin, in the first section, with some preliminaries about how to understand 
the formal structure of peer disagreement situations in a way that makes Arrow's 
Theorem relevant to the epistemological debate. Next, I motivate an adequacy 
condition for views about peer disagreement. Then I argue that conciliatory pure 
HOE views are committed to two additional constraints about the way in which the 
rational response to disagreement among epistemic peers is a function of those 
peers' higher-order evidence. After presenting a formal analogue of Arrow's 
Impossibility Theorem, I consider some ways in which conciliatory pure HOE 
views might attempt to avoid the upshot of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem as 
applied to the epistemology of disagreement. I conclude that such views are false if 
as they cannot avoid the theorem, and unacceptably ad hoc if they can. 
2. Abstract Structure of Peer Disagreement Situations 
There are at least three doxastic attitudes possible toward any proposition. These 
attitudes might be course-grained: believing the proposition; disbelieving it 
(believing it is false); and withholding judgment about it (neither believing nor 
disbelieving it).7 They might be fine-grained, such as attitudes that involve 
                                                                 
5 In Kelly, "Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence" and Jennifer Lackey, "What Should 
We Do When We Disagree?" in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 3, eds. Tamar Szabò 
Gendler and John Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 274-293. 
6 See Kenneth J. Arrow, "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," The Journal of Political 
Economy 58 (1950): 328-346; David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks, Positive Political 
Theory I: Collective Preference (University of Michigan Press, 1999); John Geanakoplos, "Three 
Brief Proofs of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem," Economic Theory 26 (2005): 211-215. 
7 See Jane Friedman, "Suspended Judgment," Philosophical Studies (forthcoming). DOI: 
10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y. 
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confidence levels: believing the proposition with degree of confidence 1; believing 
it with degree of confidence 0.5; and so on. Kelly argues that certain conciliatory 
views should adopt a fine-grained analysis of the possible doxastic attitudes.8 
Nothing I say below depends upon whether there are exactly three possible 
doxastic attitudes, as a course-grained approach suggests, or more than three, as a 
fine-grained approach suggests. My argument requires only that there are at least 
three such attitudes, whatever they happen to be.  
The literature on the epistemology of disagreement considers situations in 
which epistemic peers adopt differing doxastic attitudes toward a proposition after 
fully disclosing to each other the reasons for their attitude toward that proposition. 
Christensen defines two people as epistemic peers regarding a proposition just in 
case they have considered roughly the same evidence with respect to whether that 
proposition is true and they are roughly equally good at responding to that kind of 
evidence.9 While there are other definitions available in the literature, this suffices 
as a working definition. Nothing in my argument hinges upon its correctness. I 
require only that there are at least two epistemic peers. When there are not at least 
two peers, my argument does not hold. But since the situations of interest to 
epistemologists are those in which there is disagreement, and since every 
disagreement involves at least two peers, this limitation is not significant. 
Moreover, all of the situations of interest to epistemologists are ones in which 
epistemic peers adopt different doxastic attitudes toward the same proposition. I 
shall say that an attitude a person adopts toward a proposition is ON for that person 
with respect to that proposition, and that an attitude a person does not adopt 
toward a proposition is OFF. For example, if the possible doxastic attitudes are 
coarse-grained and if, regarding the proposition that God exists, believing is the 
only attitude Aquinas has toward it, then believing that God exists is ON for 
Aquinas while both disbelieving that God exists and withholding judgment about 
God's existence are OFF. There is peer disagreement regarding a proposition when 
the peers have different doxastic attitudes ON toward that proposition.  
Regardless of what the possible doxastic attitudes are, each of a person's 
possible doxastic attitudes toward a proposition is either ON or OFF for that person 
toward that proposition. But it seems that there are situations in which one attitude 
can be less OFF (or more ON) for a person toward a proposition than another. For 
example, imagine a theist and atheist discussing whether God exists. Suppose the 
conversation turns to agnosticism, the view that our available evidence does not 
warrant either believing or disbelieving that God exists. Further suppose that they 
                                                                 
8 Kelly, "Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence," 117-118. 
9 Christensen, "Epistemology of Disagreement," 211. 
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both admit that agnosticism is more plausible than their opponent's view, even 
though each retains her belief. Then withholding judgment about God's existence is 
less OFF for the atheist than is believing that God exists, and it is less OFF for the 
theist than is disbelieving that God exists. Surely this kind of situation is common; 
but it is a situation in which people's rankings of possible doxastic attitudes have 
more than two levels. Also consider 
Ranking. Lucy is on Let's Make a Deal. Lucy will only choose a door when she 
believes the prize is behind it; otherwise, she will walk away from the game rather 
than make a choice. Lucy initially believes that the prize is behind the leftmost of 
three doors, and so she chooses that door. Regardless of which door Monty Hall 
reveals to contain a goat, Lucy will continue to believe that there is a prize behind 
one of the two unopened doors, and in fact she will come to believe that the prize 
is behind the unchosen and unopened door. She will not walk away from the 
game. 
Let the proposition R be: The prize is behind the rightmost of the three 
doors. When Lucy initially chooses the leftmost door, the attitude disbelieving R is 
ON for her, while the attitudes believing R and withholding judgment about R are 
OFF. But it seems that, prior to Monty Hall opening one of the two unchosen doors, 
believing R is less OFF for Lucy than withholding judgment about R. For, at that 
time, she is more disposed to change from disbelieving R to believing R than she is 
to change from disbelieving R to withholding judgment about R. When Lucy is 
disbelieving R, the (non-actual) possible world in which she believes R is closer 
than the world in which she withholds assent about R.  Given this, it seems that 
when disbelieving R is ON for Lucy, believing R is less OFF for her than is 
withholding judgment about R. (For similar reasons, it seems that, when Lucy 
chooses the leftmost door, believing that the prize is behind the center door is less 
OFF for her than is withholding judgment about whether the prize is behind the 
center door.) 
The is less OFF than relation is obviously transitive: for any person S, 
proposition P, and distinct doxastic attitudes X,Y,Z toward P, whenever X is less 
OFF for S than is Y and Y is less OFF for S than is Z, X is less OFF for S than is Z. 
Regarding the Ranking case, transitivity entails that, when Lucy initially chooses 
the leftmost door, disbelieving R is less OFF for her than is withholding judgment 
about R, because any ON attitude is less OFF than any OFF attitude. 
Transitivity is an essential presupposition for the Arrovian-style impossibility 
theorem for conciliatory pure HOE views of peer disagreement. Also essential is a 
modal claim about rankings of doxastic attitudes toward propositions. 
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Depth: It is possible that there exists a person S, proposition P, and distinct 
doxastic attitudes X,Y,Z toward P such that X is less OFF for S than is Y and Y is 
less OFF for S than is Z. 
The Ranking case supports Depth. When Lucy initially chooses the leftmost 
door, disbelieving R is less OFF for her than is believing R (by virtue of disbelieving 
R being ON) and believing R is less OFF for her than is withholding judgment 
about R. Depth entails that the is less OFF than relation orders people's doxastic 
attitudes toward propositions in a way that does not necessarily have only two 
ranking levels. 
3. Response Functions and Doxastic Attitude Rankings 
Pure HOE views about peer disagreement may be understood as maintaining that 
there is a function that takes as input information about higher-order evidence 
about disagreeing peers' doxastic attitudes toward a disputed proposition and yields 
as output a verdict about the rational response to that disagreement after the peers 
disclose to each other the (first-order) reasons for their conflicting attitudes. For 
example, the equal weight view may be understood as maintaining that the 
following function is correct for the case in which two epistemic peers disagree 
about some proposition P 
 (EWV): (C1 + C2)/2 = CR, 
where C1 is the credence peer 1 gives to P, C2 is the credence peer 2 gives to 
P, and CR is the credence each peer ought to give to P after full disclosure.10 
Similarly, the extra weight view may be understood as proposing as correct the 
function 
 (XWV): (C1+C2)/2 + x(C1−C2)/2 = CR, 
where peer 1 is (indexically) the person adjusting her doxastic attitude and x 
(0≤x≤1) is the amount of extra weight that peer gives to her attitude. 
Let us call functions like EWV and XWV response functions and information 
about a peer's doxastic attitudes toward a proposition a doxastic profile for that 
peer. Then pure HOE views may be understood as maintaining that the rational 
response to peer disagreement is determined by a response function that takes as 
input the doxastic profiles for all disagreeing peers and yields as output a doxastic 
profile that those peers ought to have after full disclosure. Conciliatory views may 
                                                                 
10 For an objection and alternative to this way of understanding the equal weight view, see 
Branden Fitelson and David Jehle, "What is the Equal Weight View?" Episteme 6 (2009): 280-293. 
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be understood as adding that the output of this response function should be some 
kind of compromise among the profiles taken as input.  
Response functions need not be mathematical. Consider, for example, 
Feldman's split the difference view.11 According to this view, if one peer believes P 
and another peer disbelieves P, the rational response to this disagreement after 
these peers disclose their reasons to each other is for each peer to withhold assent 
about P. This may be represented as a non-mathematical function fF, where Bn(P) 
represents that peer n believes that P: 
 (SDV): fF(B1(P), B2(¬P)) = ¬B(P)&¬B(¬P). 
While SDV itself has the appearance of a mathematical equation, the function fF is 
not mathematical, in the same way that the function f&(P,Q) for conjunction-
introduction is not mathematical. 
The output to a response function need not be a doxastic profile in which 
there is a unique doxastic attitude that disagreeing peers ought to have after full 
disclosure. Some pure HOE views, like the equal weight view, maintain that there 
is exactly one doxastic profile all peers ought to have after full disclosure; others, 
like the extra weight view, allow peers to have different profiles after full disclosure 
by virtue of advocating indexical response functions. There even could be non-
indexical response functions that allow more than one doxastic attitude as the 
rational response to peer disagreement after full disclosure.12 Accordingly, 
understanding pure HOE views in terms of response functions is neutral regarding 
whether, for any given evidential situation, there is only one rational response to 
peer disagreement after full disclosure in that situation.13  
Information about the doxastic profiles taken as input for conciliatory pure 
HOE response functions cannot be merely information about which doxastic 
attitudes happen to be ON for the peers, even though typical presentations of such 
views give this impression. For there is some reason to think that, if the input were 
restricted in this way, conciliatory pure HOE views would face insuperable 
difficulties. 
Consider a situation in which two epistemic peers, an atheist and an agnostic, 
are discussing whether God exists. Suppose that there are three possible doxastic 
attitudes: believing; disbelieving; withholding assent. Conciliatory views about 
disagreement entail that, after full disclosure, each peer should change his doxastic 
                                                                 
11 Feldman, "Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement." 
12 For some suggestions, see Kelly, "Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence," 120-121. 
13 For further discussion of uniqueness, see Roger White, "Epistemic Permissiveness," Philosophical 
Perspectives 19 (2005): 445-459. 
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attitude in the direction of the other. But, as Kelly notes, there is no suitable way to 
do so.14 Kelly takes this to entail that conciliatory views should adopt a more fine-
grained approach to possible doxastic attitudes. But this precludes the problem only 
if those attitudes are dense, so that there is always another attitude between any 
distinct doxastic attitudes. For if the attitudes are discrete, conciliatory views 
flounder in situations where disagreeing peers adopt conflicting attitudes toward a 
proposition and there is no "middle-ground" attitude available. However, it is 
extremely unlikely that the doxastic attitudes had by actual people are just as fine-
grained as, say, the real numbers. So Kelly's proposal on behalf of conciliatory views 
preserves their truth at the cost of rendering them inapplicable to the actual world. 
Conciliatory views about disagreement can avoid the preceding difficulty 
without endorsing an unrealistic view about possible doxastic attitudes, by allowing 
input to response functions to include more than information about which attitudes 
happen to be ON for the peers after full disclosure. For conciliatory views that are 
also pure HOE views, this further information must be information about higher-
order evidence. The only such information is information about how peers rank 
possible doxastic attitudes in terms of the is less OFF than relation. Fortunately, this 
solves the problem without the costs of Kelly's proposal. 
Consider again the disagreeing atheist and agnostic. The atheist has disbelieving 
that God exists ON, while the agnostic has withholding judgment about whether 
God exists ON. Since their doxastic attitudes differ, the rest of their doxastic profiles 
must differ as well. For example, perhaps the atheist's profile is such that: 
disbelieving that God exists is less OFF than both withholding assent that God 
exists and believing that God exists, while neither of these latter two attitudes is less 
OFF than the other; and perhaps the agnostic's profile is such that withholding 
assent that God exists is less OFF than both disbelieving that God exists and 
believing that God exists, while neither of these latter two attitudes is less OFF than 
the other. If conciliatory views require only that two disagreeing peers change their 
doxastic profiles toward each other (rather than change the attitudes that they 
happen to have ON) after full disclosure, such views can maintain that the 
disagreeing peers should change their rankings of attitudes that are OFF. So, for 
example, in the case of the atheist and agnostic, such a view might maintain that 
the atheist should adopt a profile in which disbelieving that God exists is less OFF 
than withholding assent that God exists, which in turn is less OFF than believing 
that God exists, and that the agnostic should adopt one in which withholding assent 
that God exists is less OFF than disbelieving that God exists, which in turn is less 
OFF than believing that God exists. This kind of response to peer disagreement does 
                                                                 
14 Kelly, "Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence," 117. 
An Arrovian Impossibility Theorem for the Epistemology of Disagreement 
105 
not remove the disagreement between the atheist and the agnostic; but then, other 
conciliatory pure HOE views, such as the extra weight view, also allow the 
disagreement to persist. Since disagreeing peers are guaranteed to have differing 
doxastic profiles, some kind of change among the OFF attitudes for each peer is 
always possible. Accordingly, conciliatory pure HOE views can avoid the problem 
Kelly raises without making themselves inapplicable to the actual world, provided 
that they propose response functions that take as input information about the 
rankings in peers' doxastic profiles. 
Extant conciliatory and pure HOE views of peer disagreement do not consider 
response functions that take this kind of information as input. Nor, for that matter, 
do steadfast or mixed evidence views. For this reason, the peer disagreement 
literature has yet to consider adequacy conditions for such response functions. One 
prima-facie plausible condition is that, for any pair of distinct doxastic attitudes, 
such functions should yield as output a relative ranking of those attitudes that is 
independent of changes in peers' doxastic profile rankings for other pairs of 
attitudes after the peers fully disclose to each other the reasons for their attitudes.  
IIA: For any proposition P and any distinct doxastic attitudes X,Y toward P, if 
some or all peers change their doxastic profiles toward P after full disclosure 
without changing the relative ranking of X and Y within those profiles, the output 
of the response function does not change the relative ranking of X and Y. 
(IIA abbreviates Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.) Consider an abstract 
situation in which, for some proposition P and doxastic attitudes X,Y, and Z toward 
P, the output of the response function yields that X should be less OFF than both Y 
and Z. This output is based upon full disclosure of all evidence among epistemic 
peers and, perhaps, the doxastic profiles of the peers after this disclosure. The 
output is either eternally correct for the peers' evidential situation or not. If it is 
eternally correct, then if some of the peers change their doxastic profiles without 
acquiring new evidence (or losing available evidence), the output should remain as 
it was initially, because the peers' evidential situation remains the same. This 
accords with IIA. If the initial output is not eternally correct, the updated output of 
the response function depends, at least in part, upon the changed doxastic profiles 
of the peers. The intuition driving IIA in this condition is that updates to response 
function output should be proportionate to changes in peers' doxastic profiles. (If a 
peer changes the relative ranking of attitudes X and Y but not the relative ranking 
of X and Z, then if the response function output requires updating, I say that the 
updating is proportionate just if the function's output changes the relative ranking 
of attitudes X and Y but not the relative ranking of X and Z.) The motivation for 
this intuition is that, when a peer changes one pairwise ranking of doxastic 
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attitudes but not other pairwise rankings despite acquiring no new evidence (and 
losing no available evidence), there is no reason that warrants changing any of the 
other pairwise rankings, because all the initial evidence is the same; and when 
nothing warrants a change in pairwise rankings that are rational, changing those 
rankings would be irrational. If, say, there is no reason that warrants changing the 
rational relative ranking of attitudes X and Z, changing this relative ranking would 
be irrational, and so the response function's updated output regarding the relative 
ranking of X and Z should remain unchanged. 
4. Constraints on Conciliatory Pure HOE Response Functions 
Conciliatory pure HOE views impose two conditions on response functions that 
make them incompatible with IIA. The first is that there is no peer such that that 
peer's ranking one doxastic attitude as less OFF toward a proposition than another 
after full disclosure strictly implies that output of the response function ranks the 
former attitude as less OFF toward that proposition than the latter attitude.  
Fallibility: It is not the case that there exists a peer such that, for any proposition 
P and any distinct doxastic attitudes X,Y toward P, necessarily, whenever that peer 
ranks X as less OFF than Y after full disclosure, the response function yields as 
output a ranking in which X is less OFF than Y. 
All conciliatory views about disagreement endorse Fallibility. If Fallibility were 
false, then there could be a peer disagreement in which at least one party to the 
dispute is not required, after full disclosure, to change his attitude toward the 
disputed proposition to one that is closer to the attitudes of those peers with which 
he disagrees. But, according to conciliatory views, such change is always required of 
all peers.  
The second condition on response functions for conciliatory pure HOE views 
concerns situations in which all peers have the same pairwise ranking of distinct 
possible doxastic attitudes toward a proposition after full disclosure. 
Unanimity: For any proposition P and any distinct doxastic attitudes X,Y toward P, 
if all peers rank X as less OFF toward P than Y after full disclosure, the response 
function yields as output a ranking in which X is less OFF than Y. 
For example, according to Unanimity, if everyone flat-out believes that the 
continuum hypothesis is true after fully disclosing to each other the reasons for 
their belief, the rational response to this situation is to rank believing the 
continuum hypothesis as less OFF than both disbelieving the continuum hypothesis 
and withholding judgment about the continuum hypothesis. If Unanimity is false, 
then there is some proposition P and distinct attitudes X,Y such that, although all 
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peers rank X as less OFF toward P than Y after full disclosure, those peers ought to 
change their doxastic profiles so as to not rank X as less OFF toward P than Y.  
However, according to pure HOE views, no peer in such a situation has any 
evidence to support changing her original assessment of the evidence for P, and so 
no peer ought to change her original doxastic profile after full disclosure. 
All pure HOE views endorse Unanimity. For example, according to both the 
equal weight view and the extra weight view, if everyone has a credence of 0.9 
toward P after full disclosure, having a credence of 0.9 toward P is the rational 
attitude to have. (Strictly speaking, pure HOE views do not apply to cases of 
unanimous peer agreement; but they should extend naturally to such cases in a way 
that validates Unanimity.) The falsity of Unanimity opens the possibility that, even 
if everyone has a credence of 0.9 toward P after full disclosure, that is not the 
rational credence to have, because some other credence should be less OFF toward 
P. But if everyone's evidence leads them to have a credence of 0.9 toward P after 
full disclosure, no one has reason to revise their credence. Also, consider 
Ranking 2. Before Monty Hall opens the center door for Lucy, Lucy consults 
Marilyn, her off-stage friend. Lucy discovers that Marilyn also believes that the 
prize is behind the leftmost door, that Marilyn will continues to believe that the 
prize is behind some door no matter which one Monty opens, and that Marilyn 
will come to believe that the prize is behind the unchosen and unopened door 
after Monty opens a door. 
Before Lucy consults with Marilyn to discuss each other's reasoning, both women 
rank believing R as less OFF than withholding judgment about R. (R, recall, is the 
proposition that the prize is behind the rightmost door.) After consulting with each 
other, neither acquires any higher-order evidence to support revising this ranking. 
In accordance with Unanimity, any pure HOE view must thereby entail that the 
rational response to the women sharing their reasoning with each other is for both 
women to retain their original ranking of believing R as less OFF than withholding 
judgment about R.  
5. An Arrovian-Style Impossibility Theorem 
Unanimity and IIA jointly entail that Fallibility is false. I shall call this result 
Arrow's Epistemological Theorem. Since conciliatory pure HOE views entail both 
Unanimity and Fallibility, and since the motivation for IIA is that updates to 
response function outputs after full disclosure should be proportionate to changes 
epistemic peers make to their doxastic profiles after full disclosure (if, indeed, such 
outputs should be updated at all), this theorem amounts to the claim that 
conciliatory pure HOE views demand disproportionate updates of response function 
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output when peers change their doxastic profiles after full disclosure despite 
acquiring no new evidence (and losing no available evidence). 
The proof of Arrow's Epistemological Theorem, following Geanakoplos, 
involves three steps.15 The first shows that, for any doxastic attitude Y, if, after full 
disclosure, everyone in a peer group ranks Y as either not less OFF than anything 
else or less OFF than everything else, then the response function must rank Y as 
either not less OFF as anything else or less OFF than everything else. The second 
shows that, for a particular doxastic attitude Y, there is someone in the peer group 
who is infallible with respect to all pairwise rankings not involving Y. The third 
step shows that this same person must be infallible with respect to all pairwise 
rankings, regardless of whether they involve Y. 
Step 1. Consider a situation in which, after everyone has disclosed to one 
another the reasons for their attitudes toward some arbitrary proposition, all 
epistemic peers have doxastic profiles that rank some arbitrary doxastic attitude Y 
toward that proposition as either not less OFF than any other attitude or less OFF 
than all other attitudes: after full disclosure, everyone's profile has either Y ON and 
other attitudes OFF, or Y the most OFF of all attitudes. (This situation might be one 
in which half of the peers rank Y as not less OFF than any other attitude, while the 
other half rank Y as less OFF than all other attitudes.) IIA and Unanimity entail 
Extremal Lemma: For any doxastic attitude Y toward a proposition and any peer 
set of doxastic profiles for that proposition, whenever every peer ranks Y as either 
not less OFF than any other attitudes or less OFF than all other attitudes after full 
disclosure, the output of any response function must either rank Y as not less OFF 
than any other attitude or else rank Y as less OFF than all other attitudes. 
Suppose, for reductio, that the response function does not rank Y in either of these 
ways. Then there are attitudes X,Z such that the response function yields, as output, 
that X should be less OFF than Y and Y should be less OFF than Z. Now suppose 
that, for whatever arbitrary reason and despite no change in available evidence, 
every peer's doxastic profile changes so that each person ranks Z as less OFF than X 
while not changing their pairwise rankings involving Y. Then IIA entails that the 
response function continues to yield, as output, that X should be less OFF than Y 
and Y should be less OFF than Z. Transitivity of the is less OFF than relation entails 
that this function yields that X should be less OFF than Z. However, Unanimity 
entails that the function yields that Z should be less OFF than X. Discharging the 
contradiction and completing the reductio establishes the lemma. 
Step 2. Next, consider a particular doxastic attitude Y toward a proposition 
and a situation in which all peers have doxastic profiles that rank Y as more OFF 
                                                                 
15 Geanakoplos, "Three Brief Proofs," 212-213. 
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than all other attitudes after full disclosure (otherwise the rankings in the peer 
profiles are arbitrary). Call this Situation 1. Imagine that, for whatever arbitrary 
reason and despite no change in available evidence, each of N peers successively 
changes her profile so that Y goes from being ranked as more OFF than all other 
attitudes to being ranked as less OFF than all other attitudes. Let Situation N be the 
situation, after full disclosure, in which all peers have doxastic profiles that rank Y 
as less OFF than all other attitudes. In Situation 1, Unanimity entails that the 
output of the response function should rank Y as more OFF than all other attitudes. 
The Extremal Lemma entails that, for every situation between Situation 1 and 
Situation N, the response function should either rank Y as more OFF than all other 
attitudes or else rank Y as less OFF than all other attitudes. In Situation N, 
Unanimity entails that the output of the response function should rank Y as less 
OFF than all other attitudes. Clearly, there must exist a peer, n*, whose profile 
change causes a change in the output of the response function.  
Let Situation A be one in which this n* has a doxastic profile that ranks Y as 
more OFF than all other attitudes, and let Situation B be like Situation A except 
that n* has changed to have a profile that ranks Y as less OFF than all other 
attitudes. Then the output of the response function in Situation A should rank Y as 
more OFF than all other attitudes; and in Situation B, it should rank Y as less OFF 
than all other attitudes. Consider two arbitrary doxastic attitudes X,Z, each distinct 
from Y, and construct an arbitrary Situation C from Situation B that satisfies the 
following conditions: 
- the profiles for peers 1 through n*-1 rank Y as less OFF than any other attitude, 
- the profiles for peers n*+1 through N rank Y as more OFF than any other 
attitude, and 
- the profile for n* ranks X as less OFF than Y and Y as less OFF than Z. 
IIA entails that output of the response function regarding the relative ranking of X 
and Y for Situation C should be the same as it is for Situation A. Given the relation 
between Situation A and Situation B, Situation A and Situation C have the same 
pairwise rankings of X and Y for all peer profiles. Since, in Situation A, the output 
of the response function is that X should be less OFF than Y, IIA entails that this is 
the output of the response function in Situation C as well. Similarly, given the 
relation between Situation B and Situation C, those situations have same pairwise 
rankings of Y and Z for all peer profiles. Since, in Situation B, the output of the 
response function is that Y should be less OFF than Z, IIA entails that this is the 
output of the response function in Situation C as well. Transitivity of the is less OFF 
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than relation thereby entails that, in Situation C, the output of the response 
function should rank X as less OFF than Z.  
A similar argument shows that if, in Situation C, the doxastic profile for n* 
were to rank Z as less OFF than Y and Y as less OFF than X, the output of the 
response function in Situation C would rank Z as less OFF than X. Hence, for a 
particular doxastic attitude Y, there is an n* in the peer group who is infallible with 
respect to all pairwise rankings not involving Y, in the sense that this person 
determines the response function's output for how those alternatives should be 
ranked. A similar argument, considering a different particular doxastic attitude Z, 
shows that there is also a person, n**, in the peer group who is infallible with 
respect to all pairwise rankings not involving Z.  
Step 3. Suppose, for reductio, that n* is not the same person as n**. Then n* 
cannot affect the response function's output regarding the relative ranking of 
alternatives X and Y, because n** determines that output. Yet clearly sometimes n* 
does affect this output, as with Situations A and B. Hence, n*=n**. Similar arguments 
show that n* determines the response function's output for all rankings, and this 
amounts to Fallibility being false.  
Therefore, if Unanimity and Fallibility are true, IIA is false. This is Arrow's 
Epistemological Theorem, and it places a burden on advocates of conciliatory pure 
HOE views.  
If they accept the theorem, their burden is to show that, when updates to 
response function outputs after full disclosure are not proportionate to changes 
epistemic peers make to their doxastic profiles after full disclosure, the updated 
outputs continue to capture rational responses to evidential situations among 
epistemic peers. If they reject the theorem, their burden is to show that some 
background presupposition for the theorem fails.  
I maintain that updates to response function outputs are rational only if they 
are proportionate, so that any view that denies IIA is false. So far as I know, the 
extant literature on peer disagreement does not provide an argument to the 
contrary. Accordingly, if Arrow's Epistemological Theorem is sound, it shows that 
no pure HOE view can be conciliatory. For pure HOE views endorse both 
Unanimity, conciliatory views endorse Fallibility, and the theorem shows that 
Unanimity and Fallibility jointly entail that IIA is false.  
6. Prospects for Avoiding Arrow's Epistemological Theorem 
If no pure HOE view can be conciliatory, one of the most popular views about peer 
disagreement, the equal weight view, must be mistaken. Since many epistemologists 
have strong intuitions that something like the equal weight view must be true, it is 
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worth considering some options for rejecting Arrow's Epistemological Theorem. 
The theorem, after all, requires several background presuppositions, and if one of 
these were to be false, the theorem would not be sound.16 I shall consider the 
prospects for denying four such presuppositions, arguing that each prospect is 
unpalatable for those who accept views about peer disagreement that are both 
conciliatory and pure HOE. 
An advocate of a conciliatory pure HOE view might object that, even if such 
a view may be understood as maintaining that there is a function that takes as input 
information about higher-order evidence about disagreeing peers' doxastic attitudes 
toward a disputed proposition after the peers disclose to each other the reasons for 
their conflicting attitudes and yields as output a verdict about the rational response 
to that disagreement, the output of this function is not a ranking of doxastic 
attitudes in terms of the is less OFF than relation. Instead, the objection might go, 
the output of a response function is merely information about which particular 
attitude(s) peers ought to adopt toward a proposition after full disclosure. This is 
output about which attitude(s) should be the least OFF one(s). However, even if 
this is correct, analogues of Arrow's Epistemological Theorem hold under 
reasonable conditions.17 So this option does not seem promising. 
Rather than focusing on outputs of response functions, an advocate might 
focus on inputs, objecting that response functions need take as input only 
information about which peer doxastic attitudes happen to be ON after the peers 
disclose to each other the reasons for their conflicting attitudes. After all, the 
argument against this understanding of response function input relies upon a special 
kind of case, namely, one in which disagreeing peers adopt conflicting doxastic 
attitudes toward a proposition after full disclosure and there is no "middle-ground" 
doxastic attitude for them toward which they can move. That conciliatory pure 
HOE views fail to handle this kind of case does not show that they do not handle 
any kind of peer disagreement. Hence, this objection goes, even if Arrow's 
Epistemological Theorem shows that conciliatory pure HOE views are false when 
applied to a special kind of case, it does not show that such views are false more 
generally.  
While this objection is cogent, it rescues conciliatory pure HOE views about 
disagreement from refutation at the cost of making them unattractively ad hoc. If 
advocates of conciliatory pure HOE views opt to restrict the range of cases to which 
such views apply, then, in the special cases, either some peer need not change her 
                                                                 
16 I am indebted to the discussion of some of these presuppositions in Samir Okasha, "Theory 
Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn versus Arrow," Mind 120 (2011): 83-115. 
17 See Austen-Smith and Banks, Positive Political Theory I, 49-52. 
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doxastic attitude toward the others or else first-order evidence helps to determine 
how the peers should change their attitudes. But there does not seem to be a 
principled reason for allowing that a steadfast response is rational when there is no 
"middle-ground" attitude and yet denying that a steadfast response is rational when 
there is, because facts about how many possible doxastic attitudes happen to be 
available between two peers' conflicting attitudes are not facts about higher-order 
evidence (thereby violating the spirit, if not the letter, of pure HOE views), and 
because such facts do not seem to be relevant to the rationality of a response to peer 
disagreement. Moreover, maintaining that there is a default doxastic attitude, such 
as withholding assent, removes the appearance of adhockery by virtue of not being 
a conciliatory view. For if, say, the proper rational response to disagreement after 
full disclosure between a theist and an agnostic is for both to withhold assent about 
whether God exists, the agnostic's doxastic attitude remains unchanged. 
Perhaps, however, advocates of conciliatory pure HOE views can avoid the 
charge of adhockery by denying that the special cases pose any problem at all. The 
argument that they do depends upon the claim that possible doxastic attitudes for 
actual people are not dense. But, one might object, an advocate of a conciliatory 
pure HOE view need not be moved by this contingent fact, because the claim to the 
contrary may be understood as an idealization, and idealized theories do not merit 
any special concern. For example, even though the equation of motion for the 
simple pendulum is idealized by virtue of treating the pendulum bob as a point-
mass particle and the pendulum string as perfectly rigid (among other things), the 
equation remains useful and legitimate to use for certain situations in which these 
idealizing conditions do not obtain.  
There is something correct about this objection. Idealized theories often are 
not particularly worrisome. Nonetheless, the objection is flawed. The idealizations 
that do not cause concern are controllable: there is some way to take into account 
the distorting effects of the idealization.18 This accounting might involve removing 
the idealization, showing that its effect on the theory is negligible, and so on.19 
However, the density idealization is not controllable, because response functions 
for density-idealized conciliatory pure HOE views produce outputs that their 
counterpart non-density-idealized response functions deem to be impossible. There 
is no way to remove the density idealization, or to estimate the idealization's effect 
                                                                 
18 See Lawrence Sklar, Theory and Truth: Philosophical Critique within Foundational Science 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 44, 61-70. 
19 For example, see Ronald Laymon, "Idealization, Explanation, and Confirmation," PSA: 
Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume One 
(1980): 336-350. 
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because, without the idealization, response function outputs for conciliatory pure 
HOE views are either incorrect or inapplicable to the actual world. In this respect, 
the density-idealization is akin to the idealization of systems as having infinitely 
many particles in statistical mechanical accounts of phase transitions.20 When 
idealizations are uncontrollable, it is not clear that theories which rely upon them 
have any applicability to the real world. If they do not, such theories might be true 
of some idealized situations, but they are false of real ones. 
A fourth way for an advocate of a conciliatory pure HOE view to avoid 
Arrow's Epistemological Theorem is to maintain that Depth is false. If one doxastic 
attitude can be less OFF than another only when the former is ON and the latter is 
OFF, the proof of Arrow's Epistemological Theorem fails. However, Depth is an 
extremely weak claim. Its truth is compatible with all actual people's rankings of 
doxastic attitudes being such that one attitude is less OFF than another only when 
the former is ON and the latter is OFF. Even if thinking of doxastic attitudes as 
being ON or OFF and ranking doxastic attitudes in terms of the is less OFF than 
relation is new, this novelty alone does not support the strong modal claim that 
Depth is false, especially when the Ranking case provides at least some evidence to 
the contrary. 
The responses to the preceding objections suggest that conciliatory pure HOE 
views about peer disagreement are false if they cannot avoid Arrow's 
Epistemological Theorem (by virtue of violating IIA) and that they can avoid 
Arrow's Epistemological Theorem only by virtue of being unacceptably ad hoc. 
There are other views about peer disagreement that can accept the theorem 
without being ad hoc and without violating IIA. But these are unpalatable for views 
that are both conciliatory and pure HOE, because they involve adopting views that 
are either steadfast or mixed. For example, consider 
Extreme. Two rationally competent peers mistake the import of a shared body of 
evidence regarding hypothesis H. In response to the evidence, one peer gives 
credence 0.7 to H and the other gives it 0.9. However, the evidence in fact 
supports only the credence 0.3 for H.21 
Kelly takes this kind of case, in which disagreeing peers radically misevaluate the 
import of their evidence, to show that pure HOE views are incorrect. Suppose he is 
right. But suppose that these kinds of cases support a view according to which, 
                                                                 
20 See Craig Callender, "Taking Thermodynamics Too Seriously," Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science Part B 32 (2001): 539-553; Chuang Liu, "Infinite Systems in SM 
Explanations: Thermodynamics Limit, Renormalization (Semi-) Groups, and Irreversibility," 
Philosophy of Science 68 (2001): S325-S344. 
21 This adopts Case 5 in Kelly, "Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence," 125-126. 
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when all peers have the same attitude toward a proposition, the rational response to 
the evidence for that proposition is a function of first-order evidence only. This is a 
mixed view, and it entails that Unanimity is false. For even if everyone were to 
mistake the import of the evidence for a hypothesis and adopt the same incorrect 
credence toward that hypothesis after full disclosure, the rational response to the 
evidence would not be to adopt that particular mistaken credence.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
Whether a person has a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition is not an 
all-or-nothing affair. For there are situations in which one doxastic attitude for a 
person toward a proposition can be less OFF than another attitude of that person 
toward the same proposition (see Section 2). The extant literature on the episte-
mology of peer disagreement overlooks this kind of depth in people's doxastic 
attitudes. But acknowledging this depth allows conciliatory pure HOE views of peer 
disagreement to avoid certain difficulties, by virtue of denying that the information 
about doxastic profiles of epistemic peers taken as input by response functions for 
such views is merely information about which doxastic attitudes happen to be ON 
for those peers (see Section 3).  
An adequacy condition for response functions that take as input more 
information than information concerning which doxastic attitudes happen to be 
ON for epistemic peers is IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives): for any 
pair of distinct doxastic attitudes toward a proposition, if some epistemic peers 
change their doxastic profiles toward that proposition after full disclosure, without 
changing the relative ranking of those doxastic attitudes, the output of the response 
function does not change the relative ranking of those attitudes either. This 
condition ensures that updates to response function outputs do not change relative 
rankings of doxastic attitudes without reason (see Section 3). Conciliatory pure 
HOE views impose additional constraints on response functions (see Section 4). Yet, 
according to Arrow's Epistemological Theorem, these constraints are jointly incom-
patible with IIA (see Section 5). Accordingly, given IIA, if Arrow's Epistemological 
Theorem is sound, no pure HOE view of peer disagreement can be conciliatory and, 
in particular, the popular equal weight view is mistaken. 
While there are ways to avoid Arrow's Epistemological Theorem, none of 
them should be appealing to advocates of conciliatory pure HOE views (see Section 
6). Restrictions on the output of response functions succumb to analogues of the 
theorem. Restricting the inputs of response functions makes conciliatory pure HOE 
views either ad hoc or inapplicable to real cases, thereby preventing them from 
providing a general answer to the question of what disagreeing peers ought to do. 
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Finally, rejecting certain constraints on response functions themselves involves 
adopting views about peer disagreement that are either steadfast or mixed.22 
 
 
                                                                 
22 I thank George Schumm and participants at the 2011 Omaha Epistemology Workshop for 
helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
